Matching with Stochastic Arrival

Neil Thakral

AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2019, vol. 109, 209-12

Abstract: This paper examines efficiency and fairness properties in a dynamic allocation problem. The model applies to situations in which objects of different types arrive stochastically over time and must be assigned to agents in a queue, such as the allocation of public housing units. The main result demonstrates the impossibility of designing an allocation mechanism in an environment with stochastic arrival that can guarantee resulting assignments that are efficient or fair ex post.

JEL-codes: C44 C61 C78 D45 D63 R21 R38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20191032
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