Immigration Enforcement, Deterrence, and Crime

Sandra Orozco-Aleman and Heriberto Gonzalez-Lozano

AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2020, vol. 110, 430-35

Abstract: Does interior enforcement selectively deter Mexican migration? Our study shows that more aggressive enforcement increases the likelihood of having immigrants with US work experience and with jobs secured in the United States before their migration. We also look at whether having employment may be associated with lower crime incidence and shorter detention periods among immigrants. We find that employment decreases the likelihood of observing immigrants committing serious crimes and on the length of immigrant detention. By attracting quality workers, enforcement might decrease crime incidence, along with the length and costs of detention of removable immigrants in the United States.

JEL-codes: J15 J21 K37 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20201115

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