The Effects of Prize Structures on Innovative Performance

Joshua Graff Zivin and Elizabeth Lyons

AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2021, vol. 111, 577-81

Abstract: Successful innovation is essential for the survival and growth of organizations, but how best to incentivize innovation is poorly understood. We compare how two common incentive schemes affect innovative performance in a field experiment run in partnership with a large life sciences company. We find that a winner-takes-all compensation scheme generates significantly more novel innovation relative to a compensation scheme that offers the same total compensation but shares it across the ten best innovations. Moreover, the winner-takes-all scheme does not reduce innovative output on average and, among teams of innovators, generates more output than the less risky prize structure.

JEL-codes: C93 D22 D82 J33 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Effects of Prize Structures on Innovative Performance (2021)
Working Paper: The Effects of Prize Structures on Innovative Performance (2020)
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DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20211119

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