Targeted Treatment Assignment Using Data from Randomized Experiments with Noncompliance

Susan Athey, Kosuke Inoue and Yusuke Tsugawa

AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2025, vol. 115, 209-14

Abstract: This paper considers randomized experiments with noncompliance where individuals in the treatment group become eligible for a treatment but some do not receive it. We study the estimation and evaluation of treatment assignment policies targeted to individuals on the basis of pretreatment characteristics. We consider a decision problem where the policy determines eligibility, which is costly, and compliance continues to be imperfect. Then optimal policies prioritize by a weighted average of the intent-to-treat effect of eligibility on outcomes and the treatment effect of eligibility on receiving the treatment. We illustrate the ideas using data from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment.

JEL-codes: H75 I11 I13 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:apandp:v:115:y:2025:p:209-14

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DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20251063

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