Hegemony and International Alignment
Fernando Broner,
Alberto Martin,
Josefin Meyer,
Christoph Trebesch and
Jiaxian Zhou Wu
AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2025, vol. 115, 593-98
Abstract:
This article explores the interplay between economic hegemony and political alignment. Using theoretical and empirical insights from Broner et al. (2024), we posit that hegemonic states, like the United States, foster political alignment, which enhances globalization. We use UN voting data to proxy for international alignment and show that hegemons induce alignment. These data have shortcomings, however. UN voting only covers the post-WWII period, refers to a narrow set of issues, and displays little time variation. As for military alliances, they were not widely used before the mid-twentieth century. We propose an alternative measure of alignment based on international treaties.
JEL-codes: D72 F02 F52 F53 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Working Paper: Hegemony and International Alignment (2025) 
Working Paper: Hegemony and international alignment (2025) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:apandp:v:115:y:2025:p:593-98
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DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20251041
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