Reform Prosecutors and the Footprint of the Criminal Justice System
Amanda Agan,
Jennifer L. Doleac,
Anna Harvey,
Anna Kyriazis and
Lauren Schechter
AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2026, vol. 116, 388-392
Abstract:
Elected prosecutors exercise substantial discretion over criminal charges and case dispositions, shaping the footprint of the criminal justice system. We study how the election of reform-minded prosecutors affects charging and conviction outcomes using variation in the timing of prosecutors’ inaugurations across US counties. Employing a staggered difference-in-differences design, we find that reform prosecutors significantly reduce misdemeanor convictions per capita by about 17 percent, driven largely by declines in misdemeanor charging, particularly for drug offenses. We find smaller, suggestive reductions in felony convictions and no robust changes in felony charging.
JEL-codes: H76 K41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:apandp:v:116:y:2026:p:388-392
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DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20261051
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