Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory

George Mailath

Journal of Economic Literature, 1998, vol. 36, issue 3, 1347-1374

Abstract: Evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling: when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational? And, when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a Nash equilibrium (and if it is reasonable, which equilibrium)? The traditional answers are not compelling, and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer. Evolutionary game theory suggests that, in a range of settings, agents do (eventually) play a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different Nash equilibria.

Date: 1998
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