Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling

John Riley

Journal of Economic Literature, 2001, vol. 39, issue 2, 432-478

Abstract: The theory of market signaling and screening is a cornerstone of the new economics of information. The last two and a half decades have not only witnessed a series of remarkable theoretical developments but also a wide range of applications. This essay examines the key theoretical issues and explores their use in three major fields: industrial organization, labor, and finance. Considerable emphasis is placed on attempts to test the theory in each of these fields.

JEL-codes: C70 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.39.2.432
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (299)

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