The Taxing Task of Taxing Transnationals

Thomas Gresik

Journal of Economic Literature, 2001, vol. 39, issue 3, 800-838

Abstract: Financial and real investment flexibility, tax competition, and superior economic information by transnationals both create a rationale for corporate income taxation and limit the effectiveness of such taxation. While these factors have led to a variety of transnational tax policies, such as deferral, double taxation, apportionment, and trade rules, very few of these institutional features have been integrated into tax competition and agency models. In this paper, I show how the integration of investment flexibility, tax competition, and agency issues is crucial to our understanding of corporate tax policies.

JEL-codes: F23 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.39.3.800
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (139)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.39.3.800 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:39:y:2001:i:3:p:800-838

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Literature is currently edited by Steven Durlauf

More articles in Journal of Economic Literature from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().