Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's The Economic Effects of Constitutions

Daron Acemoglu

Journal of Economic Literature, 2005, vol. 43, issue 4, 1025-1048

Abstract: In this essay, I review the new book by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions, which investigates the policy and economic consequences of different forms of government and electoral rules. I also take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a number of popular empirical strategies in the newly emerging field of comparative political economy.

JEL-codes: D72 E62 K10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's "The Economic Effect of Constitutions" (2005)
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DOI: 10.1257/002205105775362069

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