Learning from Schelling's Strategy of Conflict

Roger Myerson

Journal of Economic Literature, 2009, vol. 47, issue 4, 1109-25

Abstract: Thomas Schelling's Strategy of Conflict is a masterpiece that should be recognized as one of the most important and influential books in social theory. This paper reviews some of the important ideas in Strategy of Conflict and considers some of the broader impact that this book has had on game theory, economics, and social theory. By his emphasis on the critical importance of information and commitment in strategic dynamics, Schelling played a vital role in stimulating the development of noncooperative game theory. More broadly, Schelling's analysis of games with multiple equilibria has redefined the scope of economics and its place in the social sciences. (JEL D74, F51, H56)

JEL-codes: D74 F51 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.47.4.1109
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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