Sorting through Search and Matching Models in Economics

Hector Chade, Jan Eeckhout and Lones Smith

Journal of Economic Literature, 2017, vol. 55, issue 2, 493-544

Abstract: Toward understanding assortative matching, this is a self-contained introduction to research on search and matching. We first explore the nontransferable and perfectly transferable utility matching paradigms, and then a unifying imperfectly transferable utility matching model. Motivated by some unrealistic predictions of frictionless matching, we flesh out the foundational economics of search theory. We then revisit the original matching paradigms with search frictions. We finally allow informational frictions that often arise, such as in college-student sorting.

JEL-codes: C78 D82 D83 I23 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.20150777
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (99)

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