Empirical Work on Auctions of Multiple Objects

Ali Hortacsu and David McAdams ()

Journal of Economic Literature, 2018, vol. 56, issue 1, 157-84

Abstract: Abundant data has led to new opportunities for empirical auctions research in recent years, with much of the newest work on auctions of multiple objects, including: (1) auctions of ranked objects (such as sponsored search ads), (2) auctions of identical objects (such as Treasury bonds), and (3) auctions of dissimilar objects (such as FCC spectrum licenses). This paper surveys recent developments in the empirical analysis of such auctions.

JEL-codes: D44 H82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.20160961
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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