On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey

Pedro Dal Bó and Guillaume R. Fréchette

Journal of Economic Literature, 2018, vol. 56, issue 1, 60-114

Abstract: A growing experimental literature studies the determinants of cooperation in infinitely repeated games, tests different predictions of the theory, and suggests an empirical solution to the problem of multiple equilibria. To provide a robust description of the literature's findings, we gather and analyze a metadata set of experiments on infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. The experimental data show that cooperation is affected by infinite repetition and is more likely to arise when it can be supported in equilibrium. However, the fact that cooperation can be supported in equilibrium does not imply that most subjects will cooperate. High cooperation rates will emerge only when the parameters of the repeated game are such that cooperation is very robust to strategic uncertainty. We also review the results regarding the effect of imperfect monitoring, changing partners, and personal characteristics on cooperation and the strategies used to support it.

JEL-codes: C71 C73 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.20160980
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (65)

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