Directed Search and Competitive Search Equilibrium: A Guided Tour

Randall Wright, Philipp Kircher, Benoit Julien and Veronica Guerrieri

Journal of Economic Literature, 2021, vol. 59, issue 1, 90-148

Abstract: This essay surveys the literature on directed search and competitive search equilibrium, covering theory and a variety of applications. These models share features with traditional search theory, but also differ in important ways. They share features with general equilibrium theory, but with explicit frictions. Equilibria are often efficient, mainly because markets price goods plus the time required to get them. The approach is tractable and arguably realistic. Results are presented for finite and continuum economies. Private information and sorting with heterogeneity are analyzed. While emphasizing issues and applications, we also provide several hard-to-find technical results.

JEL-codes: D50 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (53)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/jel.20191505 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/jel.20191505.ds (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:59:y:2021:i:1:p:90-148

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

DOI: 10.1257/jel.20191505

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Literature is currently edited by Steven Durlauf

More articles in Journal of Economic Literature from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().