Combinatorial Auctions in Practice

Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, David C. Parkes and Richard Steinberg

Journal of Economic Literature, 2024, vol. 62, issue 2, 517-53

Abstract: We survey the uses of combinatorial auctions that have been deployed in practice, giving emphasis to their key representational and economic aspects. In addition, we discuss behavioral economics considerations on both the bidder and auctioneer sides of the market, and the interrelated topics of simplicity and trust, highlighting key opportunities for future work.

JEL-codes: D44 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1257/jel.20221679

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