An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory

Robert Gibbons

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1997, vol. 11, issue 1, 127-149

Abstract: This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. The author gives simple definitions and intuitive examples of four kinds of games and their corresponding solution concepts: Nash equilibrium in static games of complete information; subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete (or 'private') information; and perfect Bayesian (or sequential) equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information. The main theme of the paper is that there are important differences among the games but important similarities among the solution concepts.

JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.11.1.127
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

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