EMU: Why and How It Might Happen

Charles Wyplosz

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1997, vol. 11, issue 4, 3-21

Abstract: This paper reviews the history, economic rationale, and main components of the project of establishing a monetary union in Europe by 1999. The adoption of a single currency is shown to be the best available option following the liberalization of capital movements. Most of the institution's design (central bank independence and objective, fiscal restraints) reflect Germany's fears of inflation as it is asked to give up its currency. The fiscal restraints are excessive, however, and a source of contractionary bias. The paper also presents the timetable of the final countdown.

JEL-codes: F36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.11.4.3
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (76)

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