EMU: Why and How It Might Happen

Charles Wyplosz

No 1685, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper reviews the history, economic rationale and main components of the project of establishing a monetary union in Europe by 1999. The adoption of a single currency is shown to be the best available option following the liberalization of capital movements. Much of the institutional design (central bank independence and objectives, fiscal restraints) reflects Germany’s fears of inflation as it is asked to give up its currency. The fiscal restraints are excessive, however, and a source of contractionary bias. The paper also presents the timetable of the final countdown.

Keywords: Capital Mobility; Convergence; Europe; Fiscal Restraints; Monetary Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E61 F36 F41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (77)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1685 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: EMU: Why and How It Might Happen (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1685

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=1685

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().