What Really Matters in Auction Design

Paul Klemperer

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2002, vol. 16, issue 1, 169-189

Abstract: The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behavior. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auction - a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions - may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, television franchises, companies, eletricty, etc., and especially the European "third-generation" (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not "one size fits all."

Date: 2002
Note: DOI: 10.1257/0895330027166
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (355)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/0895330027166 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: What Really Matters in Auction Design (2000)
Working Paper: What Really Matters in Auction Design (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:jecper:v:16:y:2002:i:1:p:169-189

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Perspectives is currently edited by Enrico Moretti

More articles in Journal of Economic Perspectives from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().