What Really Matters in Auction Design

Paul Klemperer

Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems (we discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles), and the Anglo-Dutch auction-a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions-may often perform better. However, everything depends on the details of the context; the circumstances of the U.K. mobile-phone license auction made an ascending format ideal. Auction design is a matter of "horses for courses", not "one size fits all".

JEL-codes: C7 D8 L (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2000-07-21
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat pdf; prepared on PC; to print on HP; pages: 20; figures: included
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/mic/papers/0004/0004008.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: What Really Matters in Auction Design (2002)
Working Paper: What Really Matters in Auction Design (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0004008

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).