How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru

John McMillan and Pablo Zoido

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2004, vol. 18, issue 4, 69-92

Abstract: Which of the democratic checks and balances--opposition parties, the judiciary, a free press--is the most forceful? Peru has the full set of democratic institutions. In the 1990s, the secret-police chief Montesinos systematically undermined them all with bribes. We quantify the checks using the bribe prices. Montesinos paid a televisionchannel owner about 100 times what he paid a judge or a politician. One single television channel's bribe was five times larger than the total of the opposition politicians' bribes. By revealed preference, the strongest check on the government's power was the news media.

Date: 2004
Note: DOI: 10.1257/0895330042632690
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (147)

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Working Paper: How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru (2004)
Working Paper: How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru (2004)
Working Paper: How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru (2004)
Working Paper: How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru (2004)
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