How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru

John McMillan and Paolo Zoido

No 4361, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Which of the democratic checks and balances ? opposition parties, the judiciary, a free press ? is the most critical? Peru has the full set of democratic institutions. In the 1990s, the secret-police chief Montesinos systematically undermined them all with bribes. We quantify the checks using the bribe prices. Montesinos paid television-channel owners about 100 times what he paid judges and politicians. One single television channel?s bribe was four times larger than the total of the opposition politicians? bribes. By revealed preference, the strongest check on the government?s power was the news media.

Keywords: Democracy; Institutions; Corruption; Bribery; Checks and balances; Media; Peru (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L82 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (148)

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Related works:
Journal Article: How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru (2004)
Working Paper: How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru (2004)
Working Paper: How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru (2004)
Working Paper: How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru (2004)
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