Incomplete International Climate Agreements: Optimal Carbon Taxes, Market Failures and Welfare Effects

Rolf Golombek and Jan Braten

The Energy Journal, 1994, vol. Volume15, issue Number 4, 141-166

Abstract: This paper provides an empirical study of optimal carbon taxes and welfare effects under incomplete international climate agreements when there are market failures in the cooperating countries. The objective of the group of countries taking part in the international climate agreement is to design carbon taxes that maximize their aggregate net income, subject to a constraint on global CO2 emissions. We use a numerical energy model to study scenarios that differ with respect to types of CO2 taxes and countries taking part in the climate agreement. We also discuss the impact on regional net income following from different international climate agreements.

JEL-codes: F0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/ejarticle.aspx?id=1182 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to IAEE members and subscribers.

Related works:
Journal Article: Incomplete International Climate Agreements: Optimal Carbon Taxes, Market Failures and Welfare Effects* (1994)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aen:journl:1994v15-04-a07

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/ejsearch.aspx

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Energy Journal from International Association for Energy Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David Williams ().