Incomplete International Climate Agreements: Optimal Carbon Taxes, Market Failures and Welfare Effects*

Rolf Golombek and Jan Braten

The Energy Journal, 1994, vol. 15, issue 4, 141-165

Abstract: This paper provides an empirical study of optimal carbon taxes and welfare effects under incomplete international climate agreements when there are market failures in the cooperating countries. The objective of the group of countries taking part in the international climate agreement is to design carbon taxes that maximize their aggregate net income, subject to a constraint on global C02 emissions. We use a numerical energy model to study scenarios that differ with respect to types of C02 taxes and countries taking part in the climate agreement. We also discuss the impact on regional net income following from different international climate agreements.

Keywords: Incomplete climate agreements; Optimal carbon taxes; Welfare effects; CO2 emissions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Journal Article: Incomplete International Climate Agreements: Optimal Carbon Taxes, Market Failures and Welfare Effects (1994)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:enejou:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:141-165

DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol15-No4-7

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