Wildlife trade and endangered species protection

Paul Missios

Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 2004, vol. 48, issue 4, 15

Abstract: Markets for endangered species potentially generate incentives for both legal supply and poaching. To deter poaching, governments can spend on enforcement or increase legal harvesting to reduce the return from poaching. A leader–follower commitment game is developed to examine these choices in the presence of illegal harvesting and the resulting impacts on species stocks. In addition, current trade restrictions imposed under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora are examined. With Cournot conjectures among poachers, the model details the subgame perfect equilibrium interactions between poaching levels, enforcement and legal harvesting.

Keywords: Resource/Energy; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/117995/files/j.1467-8489.2004.00264.x.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Wildlife Trade and Endangered Species Protection (2013)
Journal Article: Wildlife trade and endangered species protection (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aareaj:117995

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.117995

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics from Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().