Wildlife Trade and Endangered Species Protection

Paul Missios

No 56, Working Papers from Toronto Metropolitan University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Markets for endangered species potentially generate incentives for both legal supply and poaching. To deter poaching, governments can spend on enforcement or increase legal harvesting to reduce the return from poaching. A leader-follower commitment game is developed to examine these choices in the presence of illegal harvesting and the resulting impacts on species stocks. In addition, current trade restrictions imposed under CITES are examined. With Cournot conjectures among poachers, the model details the subgame perfect equilibrium interactions between poaching levels, enforcement and legal harvesting.

Keywords: wildlife trade; endangered species; enforcement; deterrence; limited entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 F13 Q2 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2013-10
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https://www.arts.ryerson.ca/economics/repec/pdfs/wp056.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Wildlife trade and endangered species protection (2004)
Journal Article: Wildlife trade and endangered species protection (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rye:wpaper:wp056

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