Designing Regulatory Policies for Complex Externalities: The Case of Agricultural Pollution

Athanasios Kampas (), Katerina Melfou and Ashar Aftab

Agricultural Economics Review, 2013, vol. 14, issue 2, 14

Abstract: The paper examines the issue of designing and implementing policy measures to control complex agricultural externalities. Complex externalities refer to the situation where a production (firm on firm) externality coexists with a detrimental (firm on society) externality. The paper identifies the optimal solution for complex externalities, which is a combination of spatially differentiated taxes. However, severe information requirements render the first-best policy infeasible. Finally, a likely voluntary scheme based on firm self-report is examined which may enforce firm compliance with the optimal policy.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; Financial Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Designing Regulatory Policies for Complex Externalities: The Case of Agricultural Pollution (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aergaa:253546

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.253546

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