Public Preferences, Statutory Regulations and Bargaining in Field Margin Provision for Ecological Main Structures

Ernst-August Nuppenau

Agricultural Economics Review, 2000, vol. 01, issue 01, 14

Abstract: Political procedures aimed at solving conflicts are becoming popular in agri-environmental economics. They are considered as substitutes for market trans­ac­tions. Ecological lobbying groups put pressure on poli­ticians to enforce ecological main structures, while farmers oppose them. Undefined property rights pose problems and statutory regulations are discussed. The paper applies a political economy model of social bargaining to the provision of an ecological main structure. It shows how a tragedy of the commons problem may prevail. Then it outlines a social optimum of field margin provision. Finally, it provides a solution to the establishment of socially acceptable rules in a political economy framework. Also, a payment scheme is introduced.

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aergaa:26413

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.26413

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