The Rural Elite and the Supply of Public Goods in Rural Areas

Xu-peng Lan

Asian Agricultural Research, 2012, vol. 04, issue 11, 6

Abstract: Based on the theory of collective action and social capital theory, social capital is introduced into the game analysis of the supply of public goods between the rural elite and ordinary villagers. I establish the income model of public goods utility concerning the rural elite and ordinary villagers; research the incentive of social capital for the rural elite and villagers, and impact of social capital on the rural elite and villagers. Three inferences can be drawn from the model: the precondition for the elite to prompt the collective cooperation is having "good reputation"; "good reputation" of the elite in the supply of public goods can abate farmers' motive of "free rider"; the role of the elite in organizing the supply of public goods can save the transaction costs in the process of collective action. Taking the case of Shunhe Village, Panyu District, Guangzhou City, I explain this model. Finally, some policy recommendations are put forth as follows: rebuilding the community credit; giving full play to the role of the rural elite in the supply of public goods in rural areas.

Keywords: Agribusiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:asagre:143217

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.143217

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