Environmental policy and wage setting

María Luz Campo

Economia Agraria y Recursos Naturales, 2004, vol. 04, issue 07, 15

Abstract: This paper studies the interaction between the performance of firms and unions and the environmental policy chosen by governments when there is a negative environmental externality from production of a good which only affects the country where the firm is located. I assume that governments choose an upper limit on emissions, unions choose the wage rates and firms choose the employment level. Specifically, I analyze the effect that unionized labor markets have on environmental policy. Resumen : En este artículo estudiamos el efecto del comportamiento de empresas y trabajadores sobre la política medioambiental, cuando existe contaminación local. Suponemos que el gobierno elige la política medioambiental, basada en un límite sobre las emisiones, mientras que los sindicatos (si hay) eligen el salario y las empresas el nivel de empleo. En concreto, analizamos el efecto de que los trabajadores estén o no sindicados en la política medioambiental. Palabras clave: sindicato monopolista, estándares medioambientales.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:earnsa:28730

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.28730

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