PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP AND GAME THEORY

Aneta Kargol and Ewa Sokol

GAZDÁLKODÁS: Scientific Journal on Agricultural Economics, 2007, vol. 51, issue Special Edition 19, 9

Abstract: Due to a lot of entities engaged in PPP, such as government (central state or local) authority or a government-owned enterprise, project sponsors, construction companies, providers of necessary equipment, plant operators, insurers, etc., they must to co-operate one another. This co-operation in some cases could be examining as a game. The better understanding of PPP games can decrease costs and potential losses. Because of relatively short time of functioning of PPP we should carefully prescribe obligations and rights of every partner and think about PPP as a co-operation, not rivalry.

Keywords: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:gazdal:58911

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.58911

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