NON-CREDIBLE INFORMATION FLOWS BETWEEN FOOD MANUFACTURERS AND RETAILERS

Cheryl Sinn DeVuyst

Journal of Food Distribution Research, 2002, vol. 33, issue 3, 7

Abstract: Asymmetric information between food manufacturers and retailers constrains the efforts of analysts studying the retail food chain. The problem may be especially pronounced during new product introductions. Manufacturers may have demand information about new products but have incentives to not credibly relay that information. Retailers often lack reliable demand information about new products. Understanding the roots of non-credible information flows within the manufacturer/retailer relationship is important to behavioral modeling in the food chain. This paper provides an analytic derivation to explain sufficient conditions for non-credible information flows leading to asymmetric information and adverse selection problems. Results provide insight about formation of information sharing mechanisms in the retail grocery channel.

Keywords: Agribusiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:jlofdr:26830

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.26830

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