Institutions, democracy and growth in the very long run

Konstantin Yanovskiy and Sergey Shulgin

Acta Oeconomica, 2013, vol. 63, issue 4, 493-510

Abstract: We tested the hypothesis of the political basis for economic rights and constructed our own variables of political regimes’ classification for the years 1820–2000. We found significant positive interdependencies between democracy indicators and economic growth. The protection of private property rights requires, first and foremost, due guarantees for personal immunity. Discretionary arrests and property seizures undermine any formal guarantees of private property, low taxation benefits, etc. Personal immunity should be defended even for “unpleasant” persons or for the possible political opponents of the country’s ruler.

Keywords: rule of law; rule of force; personal rights; private property protection; economic growth; Russia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N40 O40 P16 P50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: INSTITUTIONS, DEMOCRACY AND GROWTH IN THE VERY LONG RUN (2013)
Working Paper: INSTITUTIONS, DEMOCRACY AND GROWTH IN THE VERY LONG RUN (2013)
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