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INSTITUTIONS, DEMOCRACY AND GROWTH IN THE VERY LONG RUN

Konstantin Yanovskiy and Sergey Shulgin

Working Papers from Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy

Abstract: In this paper we tested the hypothesis of the "political" basis for the "economic" rights. We constructed our own variables of political regimes' classification for years 1820-2000. We found significant positive interdependencies between the Democracy's indicators and Economic Growth. Protection of the Private property rights requires, first and foremost, due guaranties for the personal immunity as a key precondition. Power to arrest discretionary undermines any formal guaranties of private property, low taxation benefits etc. Personal immunity should be defended even for "unpleasant" person (say, H. Ford or W. Gates) or for the chieftains' challengers (to make "rights of the meanest … respectable to the greatest"). It means the free speech; religious freedom and other "political rights" should be respected. Democracy, as political competition system weakens governments' power to break personal freedoms and property rights.

Keywords: : Rule of Law; Rule of Force; Personal Rights; Private Property Protection; Economic Growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P16 P50 N40 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fdg, nep-gro, nep-his, nep-hpe, nep-pol and nep-sog
Date: 2013, Revised 2013
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http://www.iep.ru/files/RePEc/gai/wpaper/0082Yanovskiy.pdf Revised version, 2013 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Institutions, democracy and growth in the very long run (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: INSTITUTIONS, DEMOCRACY AND GROWTH IN THE VERY LONG RUN (2013) Downloads
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