Progressive managerial bonuses in a spatial Bertrand duopoly

Barna Bakó and András Kálecz-Simon ()
Additional contact information
András Kálecz-Simon: Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary

Society and Economy, 2013, vol. 35, issue 4, 531-538

Abstract: The relationship of managerial bonuses and profit maximization is interesting both from an economic and a managerial viewpoint. Our contribution to this literature is showing that progressive managerial bonuses can increase profits in a spatial Bertrand competition, and furthermore they can help collusion.

Keywords: strategic delegation; managerial incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://akademiai.com/content/k42166101h69h557/fulltext.pdf (application/pdf)
subscription

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aka:soceco:v:35:y:2013:i:4:p:531-538

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Akadémiai Kiadó Zrt., P. O. Box 245, H-1519 Budapest, Hungary
https://akjournals.com/

Access Statistics for this article

Society and Economy is currently edited by Szent-Iványi, Balázs

More articles in Society and Economy from Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kriston, Orsolya ().