An Economic Investigation of Confiscation as a Tool against Money Laundering
Ricardo Araujo () and
Tito Moreira ()
Economia, 2012, vol. 13, issue 2, 271_280
In this paper the efficiency of the confiscation as a tool against organized crime is studied by using a general equilibrium model that considers the existence of a representative criminal organization that generates profits that need to be laundered. The main result of the paper shows that if on one hand confiscation diminishes the optimal amount of money laundered on the other it increases the fraction of resources allocated to the criminal activity. This result suggests that confiscation has to be connected to further repressive measures in other to be an efficient tool against organized crime
Keywords: Money Laundering; Organized Crime; Confiscation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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