Tax evasion under behavioral structures
Gabriela S. Pantoja and
Rodrigo Andrés Peñaloza ()
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Gabriela S. Pantoja: a Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade of Brazil (MDIC), Brazi
Economia, 2014, vol. 15, issue 1, 30_40
We study the strategic interactions between the fiscal authority and the taxpayer regarding tax evasion and auditing. We fit this interaction into a Bayesian game and introduce the concept of behavioral consistency, which helps reducing the number of available strategies and models the stylized fact according to which the choice to evade is subject to behavioral patterns..
Keywords: Tax evasion; Bayesian equilibrium; Behavioral consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 D82 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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