The Management of Natural Resources Under Asymmetry of Information
Gérard Gaudet () and
Annual Review of Resource Economics, 2015, vol. 7, issue 1, 291-308
We provide an introductory review to the application of the theory of incentives under asymmetry of information to the exploitation and management of natural resources. We concentrate mostly on principal-agent problems with adverse selection as posed by the regulation of nonrenewable resources, stressing the fact that the inherently dynamic nature of natural resource exploitation creates situations and results not found in other contexts. We also point out private information issues that may arise involving renewable as opposed to nonrenewable resources, strategic interactions with signaling between decision makers in resource exploitation games, and the design of environmental policy in which principal-agent problems subject to moral hazard may occur.
Keywords: natural resources; asymmetric information; incentive mechanisms; adverse selection; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q30 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: The management of natural resources under asymmetry of information (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:anr:reseco:v:7:y:2015:p:291-308
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