Economics at your fingertips  

The Management of Natural Resources Under Asymmetry of Information

Gérard Gaudet () and Pierre Lasserre

Annual Review of Resource Economics, 2015, vol. 7, issue 1, 291-308

Abstract: We provide an introductory review to the application of the theory of incentives under asymmetry of information to the exploitation and management of natural resources. We concentrate mostly on principal-agent problems with adverse selection as posed by the regulation of nonrenewable resources, stressing the fact that the inherently dynamic nature of natural resource exploitation creates situations and results not found in other contexts. We also point out private information issues that may arise involving renewable as opposed to nonrenewable resources, strategic interactions with signaling between decision makers in resource exploitation games, and the design of environmental policy in which principal-agent problems subject to moral hazard may occur.

Keywords: natural resources; asymmetric information; incentive mechanisms; adverse selection; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q30 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)
Full text downloads are only available to subscribers. Visit the abstract page for more information.

Related works:
Working Paper: The management of natural resources under asymmetry of information (2015) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Annual Review of Resource Economics from Annual Reviews Annual Reviews 4139 El Camino Way Palo Alto, CA 94306, USA.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

Page updated 2021-05-04
Handle: RePEc:anr:reseco:v:7:y:2015:p:291-308