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The management of natural resources under asymmetry of information

Gérard Gaudet () and Pierre Lasserre

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: We provide an introductory review to the application of the theory of incentives under asymmetry of information to the exploitation and management of natural resources. We concentrate mostly on principalagent problems with adverse selection as posed by the regulation of nonrenewable resources, stressing the fact that the inherently dynamic nature of natural resource exploitation creates situations and results not found in other contexts. We also point out private information issues that may arise involving renewable as opposed to nonrenewable resources, strategic interactions with signalling between decision makers in resource exploitation games, and the design of environmental policy where principal-agent problems subject to moral hazard may occur

Keywords: Natural resources; asymmetric information; incentive mechanisms; adverse selection; regulation; Natural resources; asymmetric information; incentive mechanisms; adverse selection; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-env
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https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2015s-17.pdf

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Journal Article: The Management of Natural Resources Under Asymmetry of Information (2015) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2015s-17

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