Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

Hülya Eraslan and Kirill S. Evdokimov

Annual Review of Economics, 2019, vol. 11, issue 1, 443-472

Abstract: This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025633

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