Large Games: Robustness and Stability

Ronen Gradwohl () and Ehud Kalai ()
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Ronen Gradwohl: Department of Economics and Business Administration, Ariel University, Ariel 40700, Israel
Ehud Kalai: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208, USA

Annual Review of Economics, 2021, vol. 13, issue 1, 39-56

Abstract: This review focuses on properties related to the robustness and stability of Nash equilibria in games with a large number of players. Somewhat surprisingly, these equilibria become substantially more robust and stable as the number of players increases. We illustrate the relevant phenomena through a binary-action game with strategic substitutes, framed as a game of social isolation in a pandemic environment.

Keywords: large games; Nash equilibrium; ex-post Nash; structural robustness; fault tolerance; viability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-072720-042303

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