Regulating Collusion

Sylvain Chassang () and Juan Ortner
Additional contact information
Sylvain Chassang: Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, USA

Annual Review of Economics, 2023, vol. 15, issue 1, 177-204

Abstract: We attempt to provide a systemic view of the process of regulating collusion, including detection and prosecution as well as bargaining between firms and regulators via consent orders, the production of evidence, and containment measures that may be taken if collusion cannot be addressed with more direct means. In addition, we try to do justice to the peculiarities of the legal system: Modeling the courts as they are, rather than as economists think they should be, is essential for economic analysis to improve the way collusion is regulated.

Keywords: collusion; regulation; Twombly; burden of proof; safe tests; consent orders; artificial intelligence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K2 K4 L4 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051520-021936
Full text downloads are only available to subscribers. Visit the abstract page for more information.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:anr:reveco:v:15:y:2023:p:177-204

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.annualreviews.org/action/ecommerce

DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-051520-021936

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Annual Review of Economics from Annual Reviews Annual Reviews 4139 El Camino Way Palo Alto, CA 94306, USA.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by http://www.annualreviews.org ().