The Political Economy of Public Debt

Marco Battaglini

Annual Review of Economics, 2011, vol. 3, issue 1, 161-189

Abstract: We survey recent theories of public debt that incorporate political decision making in rich dynamic environments. These theories provide a new framework with which to interpret empirical evidence and to assess institutional reforms that may help control political inefficiencies. We discuss the inefficiencies that lead to overaccumulation of debt and their implications for the long-run distribution of debt.

Keywords: fiscal policy; constitutional design; legislative bargaining; electoral rules; balanced budget rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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