Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies

Rohini Pande

Annual Review of Economics, 2011, vol. 3, issue 1, 215-237

Abstract: This article evaluates a body of recent work that uses field and natural experiments to answer the question of whether informed voters can enforce better governance. A common finding in the literature is that voter behavior is malleable and that information about the political process and politician performance improves electoral accountability. Limited availability of information thus provides one explanation for the persistence of low-quality politicians and the existence of identity politics and electoral malpractices in low-income democracies. Understanding how voters can gain access to credible sources of information and understanding how politicians react to improved information about their performance are promising avenues for future research.

Keywords: voter information; political corruption; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D72 O10 O50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (70)

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