The Mechanism Design Approach to Student Assignment
Annual Review of Economics, 2011, vol. 3, issue 1, 513-536
The mechanism design approach to student assignment involves the theoretical, empirical, and experimental study of systems used to allocate students into schools around the world. Recent practical experience designing systems for student assignment has raised new theoretical questions for the theory of matching and assignment. This article reviews some of this recent literature, highlighting how issues from the field motivated theoretical developments and emphasizing how the dialogue may be a road map for other areas of applied mechanism design. Finally, it concludes with some open questions.
Keywords: school choice; market design; matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 I2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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