Rent Seeking and Corruption in Financial Markets

Asim Khwaja and Atif Mian

Annual Review of Economics, 2011, vol. 3, issue 1, 579-600

Abstract: We describe recent advances in the study of rent seeking and corruption in financial markets. We outline three areas of inquiry: (a) conceptualizing rent seeking, (b) identifying rent-provision channels and their general equilibrium impact, and (c) designing feasible remedial mechanisms. We provide suggestions for making further progress in these areas and review a variety of approaches taken in the recent literature.

Keywords: agency issues; financial market design and regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G18 G2 G3 O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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