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Tax compliance and information provision. A field experiment with small firms

Philipp Doerrenberg and Jan Schmitz

Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, 2017, vol. 1, issue 1, 47-54

Abstract: We report the results of a field experiment on tax compliance with small firms in Slovenia. Firms in the first treatment group received a letter that highlighted the importance of paying taxes and the likelihood of becoming subject to an audit. In the second treatment group, tax officers from the tax authorities handed out in person the same letter that companies in the first treatment group received by post. The results tentatively indicate that (i) such letters sent by post can increase compliance (relative to an untreated control group) and (ii) the personal delivery of the letter has a positive compliance effect (relative to the same letter sent by post).

Keywords: tax compliance; audits; randomized field experiment; tax authority; information provision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H32 H50 C93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Related works:
Working Paper: Tax Compliance and Information Provision: A Field Experiment with Small Firms (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Tax compliance and information provision: A field experiment with small firms (2015) Downloads
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