Tax Compliance and Information Provision: A Field Experiment with Small Firms

Philipp Doerrenberg and Jan Schmitz

No 9013, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: We study a field experiment on tax compliance in Slovenia. Small accounting companies were randomly assigned to an untreated control group and two treatment groups. Companies in the first treatment group received a letter that highlighted the importance of paying taxes and informed about the likelihood of becoming subject to an audit. In the second treatment group, tax officers from the tax authorities handed out in person the same letter that companies in the first treatment group received by post. The results indicate that such letters can increase compliance, and trigger even more compliance if handed over in person. These findings are in line with the theoretical predictions that we derive to rationalize the experiment.

Keywords: tax compliance; audits; randomized field experiment; tax authority; information provision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 H20 H32 H50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-exp, nep-iue and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Tax compliance and information provision. A field experiment with small firms (2017)
Working Paper: Tax compliance and information provision: A field experiment with small firms (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9013

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