Natural Monopolies and Rent: A Georgist Remedy for X‐Inefficiency Among Publicly‐regulated Firms

George Babilot, Roger Frantz and Louis Green

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 1987, vol. 46, issue 2, 205-217

Abstract: Abstract. Publicly‐regulated firms are sheltered from competition and are inefficient. When analyzed within the theoretical framework of X‐inefficiency, it is discovered that they are subsidized by a quasi excise tax and result in deadweight losses to society. When the losses and X‐inefficiency are understood as rent, an appropriate public policy is to levy a tax on these firms. A tax would raise productivity and increase tax revenues without reducing output.

Date: 1987
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.1987.tb01956.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:46:y:1987:i:2:p:205-217

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